

**Internally Displaced People and Institutional Weakness in Mexico:
Analyzing the Case of Chiapas****Debilidad Institucional y atención al desplazamiento forzado en México:
El caso de Chiapas**Itzamara Díaz Vanegas¹ and Alejandro Monsiváis Carrillo²

ABSTRACT

In recent years, several regions in Mexico are confronting a humanitarian crisis produced by rising numbers of internally displaced people. Some subnational governments have approved innovative legislation on internal displacement due to a lack of regulation at a national level, expecting to provide a solution to such a critical problem. In this article, we analyze the legislation approved in Chiapas. We draw on institutional strength theory to argue that the political process in Chiapas delivered a weak, “aspirational” institution. Far from creating substantive change on this matter, it has only generated assistance-driven actions. This research shows that, despite remarkable legislation, governmental assistance to internally displaced people is still hindered by diverging political interests and weak state capacity.

Keywords: 1. internally displaced people, 2. institutional weakness, 3. violence, 4. subnational politics, 5. Chiapas.

RESUMEN

En los últimos años, el desplazamiento forzado interno se ha extendido a lo largo de diversas regiones en México. A falta de una regulación a nivel nacional, y con la finalidad de atender esta problemática, algunas entidades federativas han aprobado leyes especializadas en la materia. El objetivo de ese artículo es analizar cómo se aplica la ley para atender el desplazamiento forzado en el estado de Chiapas desde la perspectiva de la teoría de la fortaleza institucional. A través de un estudio de caso, el análisis muestra que el proceso político de la aplicación de la ley de Chiapas produjo una institución débil, “aspiracional”. Lejos de provocar un cambio sustantivo en la problemática, solo ha generado acciones de carácter asistencialista. Este artículo muestra que, a pesar de contar con una legislación ambiciosa, la respuesta de los gobiernos subnacionales al desplazamiento forzado sigue condicionada por intereses políticos divergentes y sus capacidades estatales son limitadas.

Palabras clave: 1. desplazamiento forzado interno, 2. instituciones débiles, 3. violencia, 4. política subnacional, 5. Chiapas.

Received: November 5, 2021

Accepted: March 3, 2022

Available online: August 30, 2022

¹ Candidate to doctor in Social Sciences in Regional Studies at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Mexico, itzamara.deser2018@colef.mx, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1906-646X>

² El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Mexico, amonsi@colef.mx, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8661-5935>



INTRODUCTION

Internal forced displacement (IFD) in Mexico is a dramatic reality that increasingly affects households and communities in a growing number of regions in the country.³ In a study by *Consejo Nacional de Población* [National Population Council], Díaz Pérez and Romo Viramontes (2019) estimate that about three million households (2 805 708), which comprise slightly more than 10.1 million members, changed residence to protect themselves from crime between 2011 and 2017. For its part, a study by *Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos*, CMDPDH [Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights] estimates that the number of people who changed residence within the country due to violence or insecurity may range between 185 thousand and more than eight million between 2005 and 2019 (Pérez Vázquez, Barbosa Magalhães, & Castillo Portillo, 2019).

In the face of a problem as large and humanitarily relevant, the answer from State institutions and governments has been belated, based on governmental assistance and inefficient. This problem was not recognized as such by Mexican authorities until recently (Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019; Pérez & Castillo, 2019). Likewise, actions undertaken to offer a solution for IFD victims have been fragmentary, lack suitable regulatory instruments for the specificity of the problem, and are usually reactive and episodic (Mestries Benquet, 2018; Peguero Moreno & Rubio Díaz-Leal, 2019; Pérez, 2014; Pérez & Castillo, 2019).

However, over the most recent decade, some States have passed laws aimed at addressing IFD in their territories—Chiapas in 2012, Guerrero in 2014, and Sinaloa in 2020. How much have these laws been able to transform governmental actions and the behavior of political and social actors object of the legislation in a congruent manner with the regulatory endeavors? That is to say, how much is a proposed law able to change the state of affairs so that internal forced displacement is addressed?

The goal of the present article is to analyze how state institutions appointed to offer solutions for IFD are built and perform. To reach this goal, we resorted to the theory of institutional strength (Brinks, Levitsky, & Murillo, 2020; Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, 2012). According to the theoretical perspective, institutions, laws, and formal policies have varying degrees in their ambition, enforcement and stability. Many new institutions are limited by the characteristics of the process that created them and the political circumstances in which they have to be applied, regardless of the ambition of their regulatory framework.

It is important to underscore there is no intention to explain the problem of IFD (Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019; Durin, 2019), but to contribute to understand the way the State addresses this phenomenon. It is taken for granted that the Mexican State has the obligation to protect and defend human rights and so is assumed that it is not a monolithic entity, but a structure of rules, organizations, and power where disparate and opposing interests concur. Because of this, it is important to analyze the construction of public institutions capable of providing the populations

³ The authors are thankful for the reviewers' observations and suggestions.

which had the need to flee or escape from their residence places with solutions, even if among the determining factors of IFD is coercion directly or indirectly propitiated by governmental or State agents such as local security forces, the army, etcetera.

The analysis is supported on the case study of the implementation of *Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno* [Law on Prevention and Attention to Internal Displacement] promulgated in Chiapas in 2012 (*Decreto 158* [Decree 158], 2012). The case of Chiapas is particularly relevant, as it is a state in which internal forced displacement has been a problem as of the 1970's, due to political-territorial disputes and the actions of military groups backed by local authorities (Carrasco, Benítez Manaut, & Rodríguez Luna, 2007; Mestries Benquet, 2018; Pecker Madeo, 2020). Ethnical-religious diversity has also been a factor that in conjunction with territory triggers conflicts that end up in displaced communities (Rivera, 2013). The problem of displacement became acuter in the context of the Zapatista uprising in 1994 because the federal government promoted military counterinsurgency actions (Chamberlin, 2013). This configuration of conditionings persists up to the present, now in a context of public security militarization and contention of Central American migrants.

The article divides into four sections. The first offers a general panorama of the State response to the problem of IFD in Mexico. The second exposes the relevance of resorting to the theory of institutional strength variation to analyze the laws and programs that offer solutions for IFD. The third part presents the case of Chiapas and examines the components of institutional strength. The fourth section argues that the implementation of the law promulgated in such state is characterized by high institutional weakness. Finally, conclusions offer a general recapitulation of the analysis, discussing its scope and limitations.

ATTENTION TO INTERNAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN MEXICO

Internal forced displacement is a mass movement of people defined by two attributes: its involuntary or coerced nature, and its permanence within national borders (Cohen & Deng, 1998; Mooney, 2005). The causes for displacement are diverse: environmental disasters, armed conflicts, systematic violations of human rights of social groups, generalized violence, among others (Naciones Unidas, 1998). The involuntary nature of this sort of migration comes from the need of individuals or human groups to suddenly flee or escape, leaving their homes and places of residence behind. The component of coercion or immediate risk that defines forced displacement is important as it serves to distinguish this sort of migration from others caused by extreme poverty or economic precariousness (Mooney, 2005). Likewise, this conception considers the possibility that populations are forced to migrate not only after experiencing the reasons for displacement, but to avoid the consequences (Mooney, 2005, p. 13). Moreover, as it takes place inside the national State borders, IFD is distinguished from groups that migrate to other countries and now are *refugees*.

In Mexico, mass migrations caused by the general violence unleashed in the country more than a decade ago has forced to rethink the concept of forced displacement. In this sense, Salazar Cruz

(2014, p. 54) conceives IFD as “the forced mobility of civil population that leaves temporarily or permanently their spaces of life (...) because of regional violence and the subsequent coercion system against individuals, families, inhabitants, and resources”. On the other side, it is not appropriate to use the term forced displacement to refer to people who migrated to the US due to violence and are not refugees; owing to this, Durin (2019, p. 30) speaks of forced migration or “migration of people who are forced to leave their homes for the purpose of protecting themselves in other place because their integrity and their relatives’ is at risk because of the armed violence deployed by legal and illegal actors”. In this way, forced displacement may be internal or international.

IFD has become an increasingly pressing problem in a growing number of regions in the country (Durin, 2019). Academic studies and research works by social organizations agree that the triggers of internal forced displacements are multiple: political and religious conflicts, development projects, exploitation of natural resources, natural disasters, armed conflicts and more recently, criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, racketeering, identity theft, robberies and disappearance of relatives (Díaz Pérez & Romo Viramontes, 2019; Pérez & Castillo, 2019; Salazar Cruz & Castro Ibarra, 2014).

The problem, however, is not only forced displacement events; more so, the victims seldom find due attention or the mechanisms to demand redress. The governmental support the victims have received has mainly been assistential and lacked continuity. One of the factors that explain failures in the attention and protection to victims is the poor definition of regulatory frameworks appropriate for the problem. With the promulgation of *Ley General de Víctimas* [General Law on Victims] (2013), the creation of a system entitled *Registro Nacional de Víctimas* [National Registry of Victims] was considered. In like manner, in 2014, *Comisión Ejecutiva de Atención a Víctimas* [Executive Commission for the Attention of Victims] created *Fondo de Ayuda, Asistencia y Reparación Integral* [Fund for Help, Assistance and Comprehensive Redress]. Article 5 of such law, by means of the “differential and spaced approach” recognizes people in internal displacement situation (*Ley General de Víctimas*, 2013, p. 3). However, in practice, social organizations have experienced difficulties and resistance by the agencies appointed by the law to recognize displaced people and the assertion of their rights (Pérez & Castillo, 2019, pp. 125-126). *Ley General de Víctimas* was promulgated after a convoluted and tense process as a response to the public visibility acquired by the social demand “*Paz con justicia y dignidad*” [Peace with justice and dignity], as expressed by the movement headed by Javier Sicilia (Gordillo García, 2020; Monsiváis Carrillo, Pérez Torres, & Tavera Fenollosa, 2014). By contrast, the problem of internal displacement, as pointed out by Pérez (2014), has not been accompanied by a nationwide movement that demands decisive actions by the authorities.

To sum up, at national level there is no specialized regulation approved regarding IFD. The most significant advancements in attention to IFD, in legal terms, have occurred at subnational level. Over the last decade, some federated states have promulgated laws specifically aimed at offering protection and attention to forced displacement. In Chiapas, this law was published in 2012; two years later, Guerrero passed a similar legislation; while in 2020, Sinaloa followed suit.

Even if displacement is a humanitarian problem, other states have not passed any similar law⁴ (Pérez & Castillo, 2019).

The approval of state laws that answer the problem of IDF is an undeniable advance to address a humanitarian crisis that continually aggravates. However, it is important to wonder to what extent these laws define formal objectives that intend to solve the problem, and to what extent such goals are complied with, modifying the behavior of agencies and public functionaries as well as that of social and political actors.

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH

The questions above may give rise to the analysis of the design and implementation of public programs (Howlett & Lejano, 2013; May, 1991). What's more, even considering the multiplicity of meanings and weak points each of them has, a "governance" standpoint may be adopted to approach this issue (Fukuyama, 2016). Although a great deal can be learnt from social interactions, the need to give an account of the social interactions or contextual factors that influence the way authorities respond to the victims' demands still persists. As an alternative to approach this issue, we resorted to the theory of institutional weakness (Brinks et al., 2020). The premise of this standpoint is that the weakness of institutions is built over the political process as a consequence of the interaction between actors with interests and incentives, the governments' capabilities and various contextual conditionings.

It is important to bear in mind that the analysis of the strength or weakness of an institution is not equivalent to assess the efficacy or effectivity of a policy or public program. The analysis of institutional strength implies focusing on stability and compliance with the formal rules of institutions (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). Even stable rules that are followed may produce unsatisfactory or poorly efficacious results. Therefore, by focusing on the strength of rules designed to provide attention to the victims of forced displacement, this study examines the rules' stability and enforcement through the established channels.

Institutions

It is considered that policies for the attention of IFD are institutions to the extent they are included in compulsory and binding official regulatory instruments such as laws, regulations, or operation manuals. An institution is defined as the set of norms, regulations, and proceedings that structure social interactions by regulating and enabling political behavior (Brinks et al., 2020; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

Indeed, there are broader notions of what institutions are; for instance, according to DellaPosta, Nee and Opper (2017, p. 10), institutions are "relatively enduring social institutions, which encompass interrelated formal and informal elements, beliefs, norms, regulations and organizations that rule social, political and economic life". This sort of concepts, albeit, is at

⁴ This is the case of Chihuahua, Durango, Oaxaca, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, or Veracruz, to mention a few.

disadvantage because they are of little use to distinguish the institutions from their determinants and effects. Owing to this, here we have adopted the concept focused on the regulatory and prescriptive nature of the rules, as the one formulated by North (1990), who conceives institutions as “the rules of the game”; or Ostrom’s (2005, p. 3) “institutional grammar,” who conceives institutions as rules or “prescriptions” utilized “to organize any form of repetitive and structured interaction”.

By emphasizing the official character of institutions, the present study focuses on the regulations to address victims as formal institutions; which are those described in public and official instruments such as constitutions, statutes, or regulations. Of course, in parallel to formal institutions there are those informal in nature. Informal institutions, nevertheless, are not usually expressed in writing, but are created, communicated and applied outside the officially recognized channels (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). These are social norms not based on shared values, but on expectations of the consequences of following or not unwritten laws or not officially punishable (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

Strong and Weak Institutions

It is commonly assumed that institutions are stable. Various institutional efforts with historic approach have analyzed the way institutions remain stable over time once they reach a balance point (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999). Then, change is explained by sudden events that disrupt the established order and open new ways for institutional development, which reinforce over time (Pierson, 2015). One important innovation in this field is understanding institutional change as a gradual event, which distinguishes various modalities (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). However, even from the theories of gradual change no account can be given regarding the constant replacement of institutions such as the one experienced in Latin America (Levitsky & Murillo, 2012).

The second aspect, which holds a modest place in institutional approaches, is the enforcement of rules (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). In many countries, once a norm becomes official, its efficient enforcement is expected; this is not so in Latin America, for to a varying extent the countries in the region have State and government capabilities that restrict the provision of public goods and reproduce a trap that also restricts their democratic development (Mazzuca & Munck, 2021). However, even if there is sufficient capability to implement policies, there are situations in which politicians or bureaucrats decide not to do it (Holland, 2016).

The degree of an institution’s strength, in particular, requires considering three specific parameters (Brinks et al., 2020). In the first place, the pre-institutional result, that is, the current situation or the one that would be observed, if the institution object of study would not have been constituted. Secondly, the statutory goal of the institution which institutional ambition represents, that is to say, the formal codification of an institution’s normative aspiration. Finally, the institutional result of the functioning of a determinate set of formal rules that show the effect of the agents involved or the agents implicated by the formal rule.

From these parameters, an institution's strength depends on how far the state of affairs that comes from the institutional exercise moves away from the pre-institutional state. In more precise terms, an institution is strong to the extent that the subtraction from the value attributed to the pre-institutional state of affairs minus the value of the "institutional result" is greater than zero. Intuitively, if this magnitude is zero or small, the institution is "weak". It may be qualified as "strong" to the extent such magnitude increases. Furthermore, the difference between the pre-institutional result and the statutory goal or *ambition* is as relevant because it represents the degree to which an institution aspires to transform or preserve the *status quo*. The larger this difference, the higher the institutional ambition. The smallest the difference, institutional ambition is more similar to a state of affairs in which the institution in question does not exist. In point of fact, a first sort of institutional weakness is insignificance: institutions with an ambition so small that despite law and formal regulations are appropriately complied with, they make no difference (Brinks et al., 2020); things still function even in the absence of such institution.

Following, the particular case of a law on attention to victims of forced displacement is examined. The conceptual parameters above are used; we inquire on the way the strength or weakness of such instrument is built in the political process.

THE CASE OF CHIAPAS: LAW ON PREVENTION AND ATTENTION TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Study Case

The methodology utilized in this research is the "intensive analysis of a single case or small number of cases" with a view to "shedding light on a broader population of cases" (Gerring & Cojocarú, 2016, p. 394). In this sense, we will study *Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de Chiapas*, LPADI [Law on Prevention and Attention to Internal Displacement in the State of Chiapas] decreed in 2012 (*Decreto 158*, 2012). According to the typology by Gerring and Cojocarú (2016, pp. 398-399), the case under study is index, as it is the first instance or expression of a case in which it is possible to observe the result variable: a set of norms and regulations to assist victims of forced displacement. Prior to the promulgation of LPADI in Chiapas, there was no other law at national or local level regarding this specific topic. As pointed out by Martínez Coria (2013, p. 211):

This Chiapas' law (...) is a watershed in the national sphere, in the treatment and the logic of intervention for the attention and protection to populations in situations of forced displacement; it also defines the possible prevention of displacements, with emphasis on indigenous populations.

The goal of this case study is mainly descriptive, since it has as a priority to qualitatively assess how strong or weak LPADI is as an institution. At once, it is a causal-exploratory study (Gerring & Cojocarú, 2016) which intends to identify the conditions associated with the institutional strength or weakness producing hypotheses that may be applied in other studies.

Pre-Institutional State of Affairs

The strength of an institution is expressed as the extent to which interactions and collective results are congruent with formal rules. To approach to the influence of institutions on sociopolitical behavior it is necessary to wonder then, how things would be if formal rules did not exist or were different. In the case of IFD, assessing the strength of a new regulation that intends to offer solutions for this problem does not only imply evaluating how much displacement events and attention to the victims have changed, but also to what extent State agencies fulfill their formal roles and responsibilities.

As in other regions of the country at present, internal forced displacement in Chiapas is a problem for which there were no legal instruments that offered an integral and coordinated answer from the governmental apparatus. In the face of recurrent displacement events, the strategies to support and accompany with the most continuity are those set up by local communities, human rights organizations, and in some cases, international agencies (Martínez Coria, 2013). Conversely, the intervention of authorities has been reactive and only on the basis of assistance, which makes it clear it is a problem that has persisted for several decades due to the lack of suitable regulatory structure to channel public action.

In Chiapas, IFD is closely linked to impunity, and domination and inequality relationships that have caused ethnical-religious and political-territorial conflicts for several decades (Martínez Velasco, 2005; Rivera, 2013). In 2020, following Oaxaca, Chiapas had the largest indigenous-language-speaking population in the country (28.17%); at once, it is one of the most delayed entities in a number of aspects: it has the lowest municipal Human Development Index and the second most uneven in the country (PNUD, 2019). Even if electoral behavior reflects a plural and complex society (Sonnleitner, 2012), truth is, the Rule of law and the capacity of the government in the state are precarious (World Justice Project, 2021). In this region of the country, the “State and its institutions are virtually inexistent, what prevails is the traditional and authoritarian modalities of political control” (Carrasco et al., 2007, p. 129). In this regard, it is no coincidence that the region of Los Altos, one where indigenous population concentrates and where exclusion prevails, is as well where the most families have been displaced from their community for some time now.

The conflicts that triggered IFD date back to the 1970’s decade, in a context of agrarian strife in Los Altos (Pecker Madeo, 2020). The agrarian reform promoted in the country over the 1950’s benefitted large landlords, who had created paramilitary groups to contain peasant and indigenous protests, backed by local authorities (Carrasco et al., 2007) related to the by-then dominant *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party]. This is the context of the uprising of *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN [Zapatista Army of National Liberation] in 1994. The loss of territory, denunciations of land dispossession and lack of political influence in areas in control of EZLN made the state government resort to counterinsurgency and military contention strategies that led to the confrontation between EZLN supporters and *Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD [Democratic Revolution Party] and that unleashed the

mobilization of dwellers out of the conflict zone. At that moment, the federal government encouraged population displacements as a war strategy, at least up to the year 2000 (Chamberlin, 2013). Over this period, paramilitary groups such as *Paz y Justicia* [Peace and Justice] had a key role in disseminating terror and forced displacements, mainly in the communities that supported EZLN (Ochoa León, 2011). The violence and fighting for the region's control turned into a humanitarian crisis. The displaced were forced to enter the forest or flee toward the municipal heads in conditions of extreme vulnerability, while the authority's response was limited and chaotic (Arana Cedeño & Del Riego, 2012).

From the mid 1990's to the promulgation of the law, internal displacement in Chiapas turned into a persistent and pressing problem. According to a report from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, in 2010, there were still 6 000 families living as displaced (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2011). A report from *Programa Conjunto por una Cultura de Paz* [Joint Culture Peace Program] stated that up to "March 2011, there were 25 671 displaced individuals (5 320 families) in Chiapas in 248 groups, in 33 municipalities in the state" (Arana Cedeño & Del Riego, 2012, p. 66).

Institutional Ambition

Institutional ambition is the degree at which an institution aspires to transformation from formal rules and regulations. The regulatory framework for IFD attention is considered high level in the case of Chiapas. The law promulgated on February 22, 2012, from a human rights standpoint, follows parameters recognized at international level in this regard; it offers an integral understanding of attention to forced displacement and a coordination frame to conduct governmental actions. If this regulatory instrument would be literally applied, a significant change would take place in state attention to IFD.

Directly inspired by the UN Ruling Principles (Naciones Unidas, 1998), Chiapas' law stipulates that "it has as a goal to build the foundations to prevent internal displacement, to assist and set up durable solutions to overcome it, and to attain a legal context that addresses and supports people in this situation" (Art. 2) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 43). In like manner, in article 3, adopting the definition of Principles, comprehensively defines the figure of IFD in the state:

Internally displaced people are those individuals or groups of settled in the state of Chiapas who have been forced or coerced to abandon, escape or flee from their usual place of residence, particularly to avoid the effects or as a result of armed conflicts, generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters, who have not crossed the state's territorial limits (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 43).

This regulation comprises six chapters, plus transitory articles. Chapter 2, composed of 14 articles, is particularly relevant, as it defines that "internally displaced individuals are entitled at all times to the rights granted by international treaties subscribed and ratified by the Mexican State and to the guarantees this law grant them" (Art. 4) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 43). In this same article, it is established that the law "must not be construed a way that restricts, modifies or undermines

the dispositions set forth in any international instrument of human rights or humanitarian right” (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 43). The following articles set up a frame that protects liberty, security, dignity and integrity of people in conditions of displacement. Adopting the non-discrimination principle, the law guarantees the right of the displaced to identity and recognition to their legal personality; the exercise of their civil and political basic rights; to be consulted in decisions that affect them; having full access to justice and means of defense. In like manner, it includes their right to security, health care, hygiene and compensation or restitution of their vulnerated rights regarding lands, housing, or property. Moreover, the law considered the special needs of vulnerable individuals such as children, unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, mothers with small children, female family heads, people with disabilities and the elderly, offering indigenous people and peasants “especially dependent on their lands” special protection (Art. 6) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 43).

From this standpoint, chapters 4 to 6 establish the regulatory parameters for internal displacement prevention, human assistance and setting up long-lasting solutions for internal displacement, respectively. Even, article 41 defines eight criteria to identify the “overcoming of the condition of internally displaced”: security and liberty of movement; decorous conditions of life; access to employment or livelihood; access to mechanisms for the reimbursement of housing, lands or other patrimonial goods or fair compensation; access to personal documents; family reunifications; participation in public affairs; and access to justice and damage repair (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 50).

Finally, the mechanisms to operate prevention and assistance to internal displacement are defined in chapter 3. This section considers two key instruments. The first is *Programa Estatal para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno* [State Program to Prevent and Assist Internal Displacement] (Art. 18). The second is the agency in charge of producing and executing *Programa Estatal: el Consejo Estatal de Atención Integral al Desplazamiento Interno* [State Program: State Council for the Integral Attention to Internal Displacement] (Art. 19), an organism with ample functions, among which, one finds the elaboration and updating of *Registro Estatal de Población Desplazada* [State Registry of Displaced Population] (Art. 20, clause X). *Consejo Estatal* will comprise an Executive Secretariat, whose incumbent is appointed by “the Governor of the State” (Art. 21) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 47), as well as the incumbent of 14 State secretariats and offices. Also, a wide variety of public and social actors from the human rights State organ, international agencies, involved municipal town halls and representatives of the displaced population are considered under the figure of “permanent guests” (Art. 22) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 47).

The Institutional Outcome

If one asks about the changes brought about by the publication of Chiapas’ LPADI, the answer is unequivocal: few things have changed. Between 2012 and 2020, the executive and State public administration barely made an effort, a negligible one, to enforce the law. The third transitory article sets forth “the State Council for the Integral Attention to Internal Displacement shall be set

up within a term of sixty calendar days after the coming into force of the law”. Once established, it would have “a term of ninety natural days to issue” the regulation of the law (fourth transitory article) (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 50).

The law was published on February 22, 2012, though it was until December 4, 2018, more than six years later, that the local Congress published a single resolution which “exhorts the State Council for the Integral Attention to Internal Displacement to produce the State Program to Prevent and Assist Internal Displacement as well as the report of the mechanisms that were carried out to set up such Council and if necessary report on the activities it carries out” (H. Congreso del Estado Libre y Soberano de Chiapas, 2018). From this exhortation in December 2018 to December 2020, there is no documentary evidence of the formal installation of the State Council nor the issuing of the regulation of the law or the official publication of the State Program by the State Council either, whose obligation is stipulated in Article 19 of the law (*Decreto 158*, 2012, p. 46). The installation of the State Council contemplates the publication of a press bulletin or a report in the media (Secretaría de Protección Civil, 2019), though there is no available information that verifies the formality of the act. That is to say, despite the particular actions or meetings called by the State Council within a two-year term, with no official documents that account for such activities, these are informal actions, inconsistent with the “must be” of institutional norms.

One of the consequences of the lack of law enforcement is that the government omitted to produce a *Registro Estatal de Población Desplazada* [Displaced Population State Registry]. Up to September 2020, there was no official source supported by a systematic and reliable registration of the internal displacement in the State. Usually, the information provided by the government, via *Secretaría de Protección Civil* [Secretariat of Civil Protection], is disperse, inconsistent and limited. Frequently, there are discrepancies between the figures shared by the various institutions that offer assistance in the context of their regulations. In any case, there is no official source of statistic information on IFD in Chiapas.

The most recurring actions, in a context of institutional coordination, have taken place in humanitarian aid (Secretaría de Protección Civil, 2021). However, very little has been done regarding prevention and monitoring the solution of conflicts. An instance is the displacement in the indigenous communities of Chalchihuitán and Chenalhó in 2017 (Pecker Madeo, 2020). Furthermore, the State government has not been able to ensure the security of the displaced and of the personnel that offers humanitarian help. In Chiapas, people engaged in humanitarian aid have faced obstacles such as direct aggressions, attacks on the camps, road blockades, and vandalism. These instances illustrate the State inability to guarantee not only continual access for humanitarian aid, but also to solve conflicts between the communities.

As regards long-lasting solutions, article 37 of Chiapas’ LPADI states that competent authorities will facilitate access so that international and local organizations help displaced people. However, this loss of territorial control by the State and the increase in the influence of illegal armed actors continues hindering their fulfillment (Faro, 2020; Pecker Madeo, 2020). The responsibility of the authorities to offer assistance to displaced individuals so that they access justice, recover their properties or possessions, or receive a reimbursement, has also been seriously

restricted. Organizations such as “Fray Bartolomé de las Casas” Center and *Ku’untik* Center for Human Rights have denounced that homicides are still unsolved, and that the demobilization of military groups that operate in the area has not been attained (Faro, 2020).

Finally, a key element to overcome displacement is interinstitutional coordination for the voluntary and decorous return of displaced individuals; in this regard, actions are disperse and lack regulatory and institutional articulation. Despite there is little information on the return and conditions, the CMDPDH has made an effort to monitor and document such information; data suggest that out of 23.7 percent of the returned population in 2017, the following year only 16.2 percent decided to return, whereas in 2019 only 1 percent did so (Pérez Vázquez et al., 2020). Although explaining the variation in the percentage of returnees needs more research, it may be related to these individuals’ decision to stay in the settling areas or lack of guarantees for a safe return. For example, “Fray Bartolomé de las Casas” Center denounced that 3 858 people, in January 2018, returned to their homes with no guarantees of security and under pressure from the municipal president of Chalchihuitán, Civil Protection and municipal presidency authorities (Faro, 2020).

BUILDING WEAK INSTITUTIONS

The promulgation of *Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Forzado en el Estado de Chiapas* in February 2012 was a specifically significant event. On one side, it is the first of its kind, not only at local, but national level. On the other, it is law characterized by a high statutory ambition that establishes an integral regulatory framework to coordinate the governmental actions to prevent forced displacement and attention to victims abiding by international standards to protect human rights.

However, the difference between governmental action to address IFD before and after the law was decreed is minimal. While the problem of IFD persisted in the state, the effort and actions of the government did not make any substantive change in the problem. The main characteristics of governmental assistance to IFD were still assistentialist. More than six years passed before the warning to institute the organism in charge of enforcing the law was issued, but even so, the State Program decreed by the law was not published, nor a public official record of the population in internal displacement condition was revealed. Beyond the focalized and episodic humanitarian assistance actions, there are no official reports of the actions to prevent or implement long-lasting solutions for IFD.

The institutional construction after the promulgation of the law, on the basis of the elements described, may be classified as *high weakness*. It would be a *very strong* institution if the dispositions in the transitory articles had been literally met and within the stipulated terms, or publicly informed about the creation of the State Council, its periodical functioning and the design, implementation and assessment criteria of the State Council. It would be a strong institution if the installation of the State Council, the elaboration of a State program and other functions in the law had been carried out, even if the implementation of actions to prevent, assist and durably solve

were partial. Furthermore, it would be a *weak* institution to the extent the operation of the State Council or the elaboration of the State Program were inconsistent, deficient or had major omissions. Moreover, it is a *very weak* institution since the regulation has not been integrally and authoritatively fulfilled.

Even in a context of high institutional weakness, it is important to notice the high level of statutory ambition of the law. This is a significant event itself: Why are there no similar laws in other states? Why to pass a formally ambitious law? To answer these questions, it is necessary to bear in mind the pressure from social organizations and national and international human rights advocates that took up the task and offered humanitarian and legal assistance for the displaced population, mainly after the irruption of Zapatista movement, in the mid 1990's. Besides, social demands for governmental assistance to IFD acquired international visibility, since a number of international organizations, among them UNHCR became involved by promoting solutions for the armed conflict and its humanitarian consequences. Particularly, the Law created in 2010 to be published in Chiapas received a decisive boost from an infrequent process, though enormously transcendent as it retrieved experiences from a program developed from 2009 to 2012. In this "multi-actor" process, several social organizations, representatives of UN agencies, academic institutions and experts in attention to internal displacement participated, as accurately told by Mercado Mondragón (2018).

However, the construction of institutions requires alliances with political actors in the local executive and legislative organs, which are both willing and capable of pushing new laws. In Chiapas, the conditions to push law initiatives to gather the highest international demands in this regard occurred by the end of Juan Sabines Guerrero's administration (2006-2012). Sabines had been a PRI militant, though he changed to be postulated by *Coalición Por el Bien de Todos* [For Everyone's Wellbeing Coalition], headed by *Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD [Democratic Revolution Party], *Partido del Trabajo* [Labor Party] and *Convergencia* [Convergence]. Back then, the coalition represented an opposition with greater capacity to articulate with organizations and movements demanding attention to IFD abiding by human rights. A key role to approve the new law was performed by PRD legislator, Zoé Alejandro Robledo Aburto, president of the Board of Directors of the Representative Chamber of the State of Chiapas. Robledo had promoted a legislation regarding IFD in the State and presented in Congress an initiative that would be unanimously approved afterwards. Years later, Robledo would carry on pushing an IFD law at national level.

Although building the political opportunity to design an ambitious legislation is key, what is different is to be able to monitor the enforcement of the regulation. This difference is one of the main factors that explain the appearance of weak institutions (Brinks et al., 2020). The political preferences of the creators of a new institution do not always agree on their own preferences nor with their organizational capabilities; this allows understanding the difficulties that the implementation of a Law regarding IFD in Chiapas faced right after its promulgation. Though it was published in February 2012, Sabines' administration was negligent to comply with the legislation. Shortly after, "pre-electoral" and "electoral" campaigns began in the state, the election

was held on July 1st that year, and the winner was Manuel Velasco Coello, from *Partido Verde Ecologista de México*, PV [Green Party], in coalition with PRI. In 2012, at national level, PRI returned to the presidency with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). Neither the incumbent executive nor the coalition of governing parties in the congress had been previously aware of the demands of the organizations that defended people in displacement condition, on the contrary, some paramilitary groups in the conflict areas had been linked to PRI. For as long as Velasco was in power and the local legislature under the control of PRI and PV, the implementation of the IFD law remained suspended.

In 2018, the configuration of local power in the government and the congress rearranged. The elected governor, Rutilio Escandón Cadenas, postulated by *Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional*, Morena [National Regeneration Movement], whose presidential candidate had also won. Escandón had been a PRD militant and its government, just as Morena at national level. At first, greater convergence was expected for the defense of reasserting the victims' rights. One of the earliest actions of the new local congress was to issue a warrant for the setting up of the State Council, the design of the State Program and taking urgent measures to address the problem. This warrant, it is important to underscore, was issued as a response to a recommendation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, after a favorable sentence for IFD victims (H. Congreso del Estado Libre y Soberano de Chiapas, 2018).

The renewed political will was insufficient, though, to enforce the regulation over the two following years, in which besides the Covid-19 pandemic took place. Even with the change of government, the institutionalization of the law to prevent and assist IFD has been weak. The government only reacts when social organizations demand attention to the problem. For example, *Coordinadora de Personas Desplazadas del Estado de Chiapas* [Coordination for Displaced People in the State of Chiapas] has demanded to resume the session of the State Council to ask for attention to its demands (Natarén, Aquino, Leyte, & De los Santos, 2020). To explain the behavior pattern, it is necessary to bear in mind that public administration in Chiapas lacks professional bureaucracy with sufficient resources. The governmental capacities of the State are limited. Furthermore, the operation of the regulation was appointed to the Secretariat of Civil Protection, a governmental office with no “muscle power,” in terms of political influence, technical capacity and financial resources. The secretariat above might at first instrument a humanitarian assistance plan, however, it lacks “political capital” and resources to devise a plan to prevent and offer durable solutions for IFD, apart from coordinating the implementation.

In a context where there is broad margin for divergence of political preferences of those who designed the law and those who have to enforce it, and where resources are scarce and governmental capabilities limited, both financially and territorially, the role of key social actors—international agencies, entrepreneurial groups, social movements—becomes fundamental, since their demands and decisive accompaniment is essential to move the government (Brinks et al., 2020). Nevertheless, in spite of the central role of human rights social organizations and international organisms, the mobilization of society to promote the implementation of the law regarding IFD has been scarce. The task of vigorously enforcing the law faces, besides, the

resistance different social actors may pose. In Chiapas, IFD originates in political-territorial conflicts in which local caciques, paramilitary groups and other individuals with little interest in changing in the name of justice, peace and human rights, are involved. The implementation of long-lasting solutions for IFD does not simply entail searching for negotiation and agreement, but to force various actors who take the role of “State challengers” (Eaton, 2012, p. 648), who defend their interests by means of corruption, weapons and violence.

The construction of institutionalism that prevents, addresses and offers long-lasting solutions for forced displacement in Chiapas has an ambitious legal support, though it does not have much more than that. Likewise, as it was the case of the legislation aimed to combat violence against women in Mexico, the result of this political process of institutional construction was an “aspirational” institution (Htun & Jensenius, 2020) for a transforming regulatory order in harmony with the international regulations in this regard “expecting it to be complied with in the future” (Brinks et al., 2020, p. 26). However, those who pay the price of the lack of implementation are still displaced people. Institutional weakness has as a consequence that the population is still vulnerable to violence and the violation of their rights.

CONCLUSIONS

Internal forced displacement is a persistent and growing problem in Mexico. On the basis of an analysis of the *Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en Estado de Chiapas*, the first of its kind in the country, this study shows how weak institutions regarding attention to IFD at subnational scale are produced. The political process in this state has produced a weak institution, as it establishes a formal ambitious expectation, but the governmental behavior to face the problem of IFD has changed very little, despite the legislation. Even if it may be considered a case of “aspirational” institutional weakness, in practice this means that the rights of displaced people are still violated.

The analysis shows that the law of Chiapas is formally ambitious, as it was produced following the highest international standards. This is explained by the strategic role which local and international social organizations have carried out to reassert integral attention to the problem for long time. However, the key for its approval was the change in the local government and the individual commitment of politicians familiarized with influence and decision capability. This allows conjecturing that both the likelihood of approving similar laws and their regulatory capability depends on the concurrence of similar circumstances.

At once, we found that a weak institutional construction is associated to a combination of factors: the ascension to power of political groups with divergent preferences and little commitment to the topic; limited resources and capabilities in the government; lack of accompaniment by a majority of society, at local and national scale; and the power of social, political groups, and even criminal organizations that reject the rule of law. In Chiapas, IFD is linked to a series of long-standing political territorial conflicts. Not only do these conflicts have an ethnic-religious component, but are the consequence of all the territorial disputes among

indigenous communities, insurgent groups, paramilitary groups and cacique leaderships affiliated to political parties.

Even if this article focuses on the case of Chiapas, we consider that the findings here may be revealing to understand the dynamics of law formation and enforcement related to IFD in this and other states in the country. In the analysis of this case, the intention is to offer elements that contribute to research the development of institutions that respond to forced displacement in other states in the country. In this task, the study of the variation of institutional force may be strengthened with gathered and systematized information resorting to various methodologies from ethnography to tracking processes, to mention a few.

Above all, we want to underscore the importance of studying the way in which the Mexican State—with all its complexity and internal differentiation—responds to a grave problem of humanitarian and human rights nature. Certainly, a crucial determinant of the current IFD crisis is the role performed by State and governmental agents in prompting forced displacement. In this sense, the persisting militarization of public security and an erratic policy to fight organized crime might aggravate further the problem. However, this does not mean that the Mexican State lacks obligations, regulatory faculties and the organizational instruments to act in consequence.

Further research is needed to assess how subnational governments respond to IFD, as limited or as weak as those responses might be. This study shows that IFD is a problem that requires the construction of strong and innovative institutions, capable of articulating multisectoral efforts at all State levels. We consider it necessary to study the circumstances that propitiate and the actors that promote new rules and organizations that protect and ensure the respect of the human rights of people forced to abandon their homes or places of residence.

Translation: Luis Cejudo-Espinosa.

REFERENCES

- Arana Cedeño, M. & Del Riego, M. T. (2012). *Estudio sobre los desplazados por el conflicto armado en Chiapas*. San Cristobal de las Casas: Programa Conjunto por una Cultura de Paz. Retrieved from https://www.sdgfund.org/sites/default/files/CPBPB_%20ESTUDIO_%20Mexico_Estudio%20sobre%20los%20desplazados.pdf
- Brinks, D. M., Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2020). The political origins of institutional weakness. In D. M. Brinks, S. Levitsky, & M. V. Murillo (Eds.), *The political origins of institutional weakness in Latin America* (pp. 1-40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carrasco, T., Benítez Manaut, R., & Rodríguez Luna, A. (2007). La crisis de Chiapas: negociaciones, democracia y gobernabilidad. *LiminaR. Estudios Sociales y Humanísticos*, 5(2), 129-143. Retrieved from <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=74511236009>

- Chamberlin, M. W. (2013). El desplazamiento forzado como estrategia de guerra en Chiapas. In Ó. Tórrens (Coord.), *El desplazamiento interno forzado en México. Un acercamiento para su reflexión y análisis* (pp. 33-52). Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social/El Colegio de Sonora/Senado de la República.
- Cohen, R. & Deng, F. M. (1998). *Masses in flight. The global crisis of internal displacement*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Decreto 158. *Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de Chiapas. Periódico Oficial*, 355, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas, February 22, 2012. Retrieved from <https://www.sgg.chiapas.gob.mx/periodico/periodico0612>
- DellaPosta, D., Nee, V., & Opper, S. (2017). Endogenous dynamics of institutional change. *Rationality and Society*, 29(1), 5-48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463116633147>
- Díaz Pérez, M. C. & Romo Viramontes, R. (2019). *La violencia como causa de desplazamiento interno forzado. Aproximaciones a su análisis en México*. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población/Secretaría de Gobernación. Retrieved from https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/456109/Desplaz_2019_web_color-comp.pdf
- Durin, S. (2019). *¡Sálvese quien pueda! Violencia generalizada y desplazamiento forzado en el noreste de México*. Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social.
- Eaton, K. (2012). The state of the state in Latin America: Challenges, challengers, responses and deficits. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32(3), 643-657.
- Faro, P. (April 12, 2020). Desplazamiento forzado en Chiapas: los impactos de la violencia y la impunidad. *Centro de Derechos Humanos. Fray Bartolomé de las Casas*. Retrieved from <https://frayba.org.mx/desplazamiento-forzado-en-chiapas-los-impactos-de-la-violencia-y-la-impunidad/>
- Fukuyama, F. (2016). Governance: What do we know, and how do we know it? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 89-105. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044240>
- Gerring, J. & Cojocar, L. (2016). Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 45(3), 392-423. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124116631692>
- Gordillo García, J. (2020). Lenguaje de derechos y apertura de oportunidades legales para el cambio social: El Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad y la Ley General de Víctimas. *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, 65(239), 291-321. <https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.239.71133>
- Hall, P. A. & Taylor, C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5), 936-957. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x>
- H. Congreso del Estado Libre y Soberano de Chiapas. (December 4, 2018). *Punto de Acuerdo*. Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Honorable Sexagésima Séptima Legislatura Constitucional. Retrieved from

http://www.congresochiapas.gob.mx/new/Info-Parlamentaria/iniciativas/INI_DEC_0295.pdf?v=NA

- Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(4), 725-740. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040472>
- Holland, A. C. (2016). Forbearance. *American Political Science Review*, 110(2), 232-246. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000083>
- Howlett, M. & Lejano, R. P. (2013). Tales from the crypt: The rise and fall (and rebirth?) of policy design. *Administration & Society*, 45(3), 357-381. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399712459725>
- Htun, M. & Jensenius, F. R. (2020). Aspirational laws as weak institutions: Legislation to combat violence against women in Mexico. In D. M. Brinks, S. Levitsky & M. V. Murillo (Eds.), *The political origins of institutional weakness in Latin America* (pp. 141-160). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2011). *Mexico: Displacement due to criminal and communal violence*. Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201111-am-mexico-overview-en.pdf>
- Levitsky, S. & Murillo, M. V. (2009). Variation in Institutional Strength. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1), 115-133. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756>
- Levitsky, S. & Murillo, M. V. (2012). Construyendo instituciones sobre cimientos débiles: Lecciones desde América Latina. *Politai*, 3(5), 17-44.
- Ley General de Víctimas*. *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. Secretaría de Gobernación. Mexico City, January 9, 2013. Retrieved from https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5284359&fecha=09/01/2013#gsc.tab=0
- Mahoney, J. & Thelen, K. (2010). A theory of gradual institutional change. In J. Mahoney & K. Thelen (Eds.), *Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power* (pp. 1-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martínez Coria, R. (2013). Poblaciones indígenas desplazadas por conflicto armado en México: diálogo político, cooperación multilateral y transformación legislativa. In O. Torrens (Coord.), *El desplazamiento interno forzado en México. Un acercamiento para su reflexión y análisis* (pp. 195-219). Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social/Colegio de Sonora/Senado de la República.
- Martínez Velasco, G. (2005). Conflicto étnico y migraciones forzadas en Chiapas. *Política y Cultura*, (23), 195-210. Retrieved from <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/polcul/n23/n23a12.pdf>
- May, P. J. (1991). Reconsidering policy design: Policies and publics. *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(2), 187-206. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X0000619X>

- Mazzuca, S. L., & Munck, G. L. (2021). *A middle-quality institutional trap: Democracy and state capacity in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108878449>
- Mercado Mondragón, J. (2018). Pueblos indios y desplazamiento interno forzado. El camino recorrido para el establecimiento de una ley para el estado de Chiapas. *Cuicuilco. Revista de Ciencias Antropológicas*, 25(73), 133-163. Retrieved from <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=529560660007>
- Mestries Benquet, F. (2018). Políticas públicas y derechos de los desplazados internos forzados. *Cuicuilco. Revista de Ciencias Antropológicas*, 25(73), 99-131. Retrieved from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2448-84882018000300099
- Monsiváis Carrillo, A., Pérez Torres, A., & Tavera Fenollosa, L. (2014). Protesta social, política deliberativa y democracia: Un análisis de los “Diálogos por la Paz” en México. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 34(3), 623-643. Retrieved from <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32433390006>
- Mooney, E. (2005). The concept of internal displacement and the case for internally displaced persons as a category of concern. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 24(3), 9-26. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/9.pdf>
- Naciones Unidas. (1998). *Principios Rectores de los desplazamientos internos*. Organización de las Naciones Unidas/Comisión de Derechos Humanos. Retrieved from <https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2001/0022.pdf>
- Natarén, L., Aquino, M., Leyte, A. L., & De los Santos, S. (2020). Desplazamiento forzado en Chiapas, un martirio prolongado. *Aquínoticias*. Retrieved from <https://aquínoticias.mx/desplazamiento-forzado-en-chiapas-un-martirio-prolongado/>
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678>
- Ochoa León, P. (2011). Conflicto armado y grupos paramilitares en Chiapas: Implicaciones para la democracia mexicana. *Desafíos*, 23(1), 175-216. Retrieved from <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=359633169006>
- Ostrom, E. (2005). *Understanding institutional diversity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7s7wm>
- Pecker Madeo, C. (2020). Entre Chenalhó y Chalchihuitán: (in)movilidad forzada y límites en disputa. *EntreDiversidades*, 7(2), 280-307. <https://doi.org/10.31644/ED.V7.N2.2020.A10>
- Peguero Moreno, M. & Rubio Díaz-Leal, L. (2019). *El desplazamiento forzado interno en México: Respuestas del Estado y litigio estratégico*. Mexico City: Tirant lo Blanch.
- Pérez, B. (2014). El tema del desplazamiento interno en la agenda pública: una comparación de su situación en México y Colombia. *El Cotidiano*, (183), 7-16. Retrieved from <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32529943002>

- Pérez, B. & Castillo, M. (2019). Huir de las violencias: las víctimas ocultas de la guerra en México: El caso del desplazamiento interno forzado. *Encartes*, 2(3), 112-143. Retrieved from <https://encartes.mx/mexico-desplazamiento-forzado/>
- Pérez Vázquez, B., Barbosa Magalhães, L. de A., & Castillo Portillo, M. (2019). *Entre la invisibilidad y el abandono: un acercamiento cuantitativo al desplazamiento interno forzado en México*. Mexico City: Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de Derechos Humanos/Fundación Panamericana para el Desarrollo. Retrieved from <http://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-entre-la-invisibilidad-y-el-abandano-acercamiento-cuantitativo-al-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico.pdf>
- Pierson, P. (2015). Power and path dependence. In K. Thelen & J. Mahoney (Eds.), *Advances in comparative-historical analysis* (pp. 123-146). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD). (2019). *Transformando México desde lo local. Informe de Desarrollo Humano Municipal 2010-2015*. Mexico: Offset Santiago. Retrieved from <https://www.mx.undp.org/content/mexico/es/home/library/poverty/informe-de-desarrollo-humano-municipal-2010-2015--transformando-.html>
- Rivera, C. (2013). Creencias y prácticas religiosas censuradas. Expulsión de evangélicos indígenas por cambio de adscripción religiosa. In Ó. Tórrens (Coord.), *El desplazamiento interno forzado en México. Un acercamiento para su reflexión y análisis* (pp. 75-112). Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social/Colegio de Sonora/Senado de la República.
- Salazar Cruz, L. M. (2014). Modalidades del desplazamiento interno forzado en México. *Iztapalapa. Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades*, 35(76), 53-81. <http://dx.doi.org/10.28928/ri/762014/atc2/salazarcruzlm>
- Salazar Cruz, L. M. & Castro Ibarra, J. M. (2014). Tres dimensiones del desplazamiento interno forzado en México. *El Cotidiano*, (183), 57-66. Retrieved from <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32529943008>
- Secretaría de Protección Civil. (January 15, 2021). *Gobierno de Chiapas mantiene atención a personas en condición de desplazamiento* (Press release, no. 3). Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Gobierno de Chiapas. Retrieved from <https://proteccioncivil.chiapas.gob.mx/gobierno-de-chiapas-mantiene-atencion-a-personas-en-condicion-de-desplazamiento>
- Secretaría de Protección Civil. (January 17, 2019). *Acuerda Consejo Estatal de Atención Integral al Desplazamiento Interno reforzar acciones de atención a la población*. Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Secretaría de Protección Civil/Gobierno de Chiapas. Retrieved from <https://proteccioncivil.chiapas.gob.mx/acuerda-consejo-estatal-de-atencion-integral-al-desplazamiento-interno-reforzar-acciones-de-atencion-a-la-poblacion>
- Sonnleitner, W. (2012). *Elecciones chiapanecas: del régimen posrevolucionario al desorden democrático*. Mexico City: El Colegio de México.

- Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1), 369-404. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369>
- World Justice Project. (2021). *Índice de Estado de Derecho en México 2020-2021*. Mexico City: World Justice Project. Retrieved from https://worldjusticeproject.mx/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/1_msi-2020-2021-ESP.pdf