Externalidades regionales y la provisión de bienes públicos en un sistema descentralizado de gobiernos subnacionales

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Published: Mar 16, 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17428/rfn.v22i43.875

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Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez

Abstract

En este artículo se desarrolla un modelo electoral de votos probabilísticos para racionalizar la provisión de bienes públicos locales en un sistema descentralizado de gobiernos locales autónomos. En nuestra economía, la heterogeneidad de preferencias por bienes públicos conlleva a un problema de elección social que es resuelto mediante una elección estatal. El modelo teórico sugiere una serie de proposiciones sobre los determinantes del gasto público que pueden ser verificadas empíricamente. En particular, el modelo sugiere que si los bienes públicos no muestran externalidades regionales, el gasto del gobierno es explicado por la distribución del ingreso y la población en la entidad.Si los bienes públicos muestran externalidades regionales, la distribución del ingreso y el costo de los bienes públicos a lo largo de la economía (y no sólo de la entidad) determinan el gasto público estatal. El modelo también permite identificar algunas configuraciones del ingreso en la economía que pueden llevar a asimetrías en la oferta de bienes públicos que resultan de una reducción en el promedio del costo per cápita de los bienes públicos.Regional Externalities and the Provision of Public Goodsin a Descentralized System of Subnational GovernmentsAbstractIn this article, we develop a probabilistic voting model for the provision of local public goods in a decentralized system of local governments. In our economy, the heterogeneity of preferences for local public goods leads to a social choice problem that is solved through a state-level election. Our theoretical model provides empirically verifiable propositions about the determinants of public spending. In particular, our model suggests that in the absence of regional externalities affecting local public goods, distribution of income and the population in the locality explain the size of public spending.When regional externalities do exist, income distribution and the price of public goods in the overall economy, not just the state’s economy, determine public spending by the state. Our model also identifies certain income configurations in the economy that can lead to asymmetries in the supply of local public goods as a result of the reduction in the average per-capita cost of public goods.

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How to Cite
Ponce Rodríguez, R. A. (2017). Externalidades regionales y la provisión de bienes públicos en un sistema descentralizado de gobiernos subnacionales. Frontera Norte, 22(43), 159–186. https://doi.org/10.17428/rfn.v22i43.875
Issue
Vol. 22 No. 43 (2010): enero-junio, 2010
Section
Papers

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